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The Sixth Circuit's Approach to the Public-Policy
Exception to the Enforcement of Labor Arbitration
Awards: A Tale of Two Trilogies?*
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act1 makes
collective bargaining agreements entered into by employers and unions
enforceable in the federal courts. In the Lincoln Mill 2 and Steelworkers
Trilogy cases, the Supreme Court construed this section as announcing a
national policy favoring the peaceful, contractual resolution of disputes, and
that the use of arbitration as a means of resolving any contractual disputes,
in place of measures which tend to cause industrial destabilization, i.e.
strikes or lockouts, was especially favored. In the cases that comprise the
Trilogy, Justice Douglas used broad, idealistic imagery to support the
Court's expansive interpretation of section 301. 4 Viewing the benefit as one
accruing primarily to the union, the Court implied a no-strike clause even in
its actual absence, declaring that it serves as the quid pro quo for the
arbitration clause. 5 The legal result of the Trilogy was a message to the
* The author wishes to thank Professor James Brudney for his comments on an earlier
draft. This Note is dedicated to the memory of Arlus W. Stephens, Jr. (1935-1995), who was
much loved and is sorely missed.
1 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1995).
2 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (holding
that parties to a collective bargaining agreement can seek enforcement of its terms, including
arbitration provisions, in federal district court and announcing that the federal courts were to
create a body of federal common law for labor arbitration).
3 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (holding that the
strength of a grievance is not a factor to be considered by a court in deciding whether to order
compliance with an arbitration clause); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (holding that doubts concerning the contractual arbitrability of a
particular grievance should be resolved in favor of arbitration); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (holding that courts are to defer to an
arbitrator's decision so long as it derives its "essence" from the agreement).
4 E.g., 'The collective bargaining agreement covers the whole employment relationship.
It calls into being a new common law-the common law of a particular industry or of a
particular plant . . . . A collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of
industrial self-government." Warrior & Gulf Navigadion Co., 363 U.S. at 579-80.
5 Lincoln MilLs, 353 U.S. at 455. An employer can, therefore, sue the union for
damages in the event of a breach. See Local 174, Int'l Ed. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95 (1962). In Boys Markets', Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235
(1970), the Court carved out an exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, holding that an
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lower courts that they were to overcome any prejudice they may have
towards arbitration, and, moreover, that they were to enforce arbitration
clauses and arbitration awards except under a few, narrow circumstances.
The practical result of these cases has been widespread use of
arbitration 6 and a substantial reduction in strike activity. 7 Both employers
and unions have, for the most part, found that the use of arbitration and the
grievance process in general, produces tangible and intangible benefits. The
presence of a contract and a predetermined system for dispute resolution
(i.e., arbitration) lends stability and predictability to the relationship. Also,
the system is generally more cost-effective for the parties than is litigation
or resort to economic force. 8 Finally, the system is quick, or meant to be
so, 9 with the intended result that the parties can move on to other disputes.
employer can obtain an injunction against a strike if it occurs during the term of a collective
bargaining agreement containing an arbitration provision, causing the union to be subject to a
contempt order if it continues to strike. The Court subsequently held in Gateway Coal Co. v.
United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974), that so long as the matter is even arguably
subject to arbitration, an injunction can issue. Thus, employees who refuse to work in protest
of unsafe conditions can be jailed for contempt of court. For discussion and criticism of this
judicial activism, see Juuus G. GERMAN & BERTRAND B. POOREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: THE
BASIC PROCESSES, LAW AND PRACTICE 178-82 (1988).
6 Approximately 96% of collective bargaining agreements contain an arbitration clause.
ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 745 (11th ed. 1991).
7 There are, however, a number of other reasons for this decline, including the overall
percentage decline in union representation, the likelihood of losing one's job to a permanent
replacement during a strike, and the ability of employers to prepare for and work around
strikes. Craig Becker, "Better Than a Strike: Protecting New Forms of Collective Work
Stoppages Under the National Labor Relations Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 353 (1994)
(discussing different reasons for the decline and noting that "the potency of the strike has been
annihilated*); Steven Greenhouse, Strikes at 50-Year Low, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1996, at
A12 (noting that insecurity in a worsening economy and fear of losing one's job to a
permanent replacement during a strike are key considerations).
8 Exception must be made here for unions (and some employers) that do not have the
financial wherewithal to pay for their share of an arbitrator's fee or for the services of a
lawyer to represent them in the arbitration. See THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE You
ON? 164-68 (1991) (discussing the financial impact of arbitrations on cash-strapped local
unions). For them, contracts can go unenforced because the union cannot afford enforcement.
Were they permitted to engage in wildcat strikes and forego a day's pay rather than expend
several thousand dollars for an arbitration, the contract might be enforced.
9 See AFL-CIO, Arbitration Association Plan Program to Speed Simple Grievance Cases,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D16 (May 31, 1995) (discussing a plan by which stream-lined
arbitration procedures will be developed to make the process quicker and cheaper than it
currently is).
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These benefits, however, are largely premised upon judicial deferral to
the ultimate findings and holding of the arbitrator, i.e., finality. The Court
addressed this issue in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 10 where it held that the proper role of a judge forced to review an
arbitration award for purposes of enforcement is to defer to the award.
While the Court provided several reasons for this, the key practical reason
is conservation of resources. Once judicial review enters the mix, an
arbitration proceeding becomes just one more step in protracted litigation of
the dispute,"I and the process becomes neither quick nor cheap. The benefits
from quick dispute resolution vanish as motions are filed and appeals
docketed. Further, the Court's attempt to remove the use of economic
weapons from the resolution of disputes fails as well where one side,
typically the employer, has the financial wherewithal to expend large sums
of money in litigation over the arbitration award and beat the other side,
typically the union, into submission. 12 Litigation as an economic weapon is
being used more frequently as losing parties refuse to abide by the outcome
of arbitration awards and force litigation on the issue.13
One of the most popularK4 -and uncertain-bases upon which awards
are challenged is that they contravene public policy and are, therefore,
10 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
11 'Arbitration will not work if legal contests are its bookends: a suit to compel or
prevent arbitration, the arbitration itself, and a suit to enforce or set aside the award.
Arbitration then becomes more costly than litigation, for if the parties had elected to litigate
their disputes they would have had to visit court only once." Production & Maintenance
Employees' Local 504 v. Roadmaster Corp., 916 F.2d 1161, 1163 (7th Cir. 1990).
12 When confronted with a union's request for attorney's fees expended in a suit to
enforce an arbitration award, Judge Posner stated:
We share with the union and the district court concern lest companies defeat the
objectives of labor arbitration clauses that they have voluntarily negotiated by routinely
refusing to honor such awards without any valid grounds for doing so, in order to put
the union to the expense of getting the award enforced in court.
Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1168 (7th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985) (noting that the Seventh Circuit will scrutinize
arbitration-enforcement cases to determine the propriety of sanctions); see also Douglas E.
Ray, Protecting the Pares' Bargain After Misco: Court Review of Labor Arbitration Awards,
64 IND. LJ. 1, 12-13 (1988) (demonstrating time delay caused by litigation over awards).
13 See Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, 7he Steelworkers Trilogy and Grievance
Arbitration Appeals: How the Federal Cours Respond, 13 INDUS. REL. LJ. 78, 118 (1991)
(noting that results of empirical study indicate a dramatic increase in lappeals of labor
arbitration awards during the 1980's).
14 Id. at 88-92 (noting trend toward increased use).
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unenforceable by the courts. 15 While the courts have long had a general
equitable power to refuse enforcement of public-policy-offending
contracts, 16 the Supreme Court did not address the doctrine's applicability
to labor contracts until 1983.17 When confusion resulted and splits between
the circuits developed as to the breadth of this public-policy exception, the
Court addressed the issue again in United Paperworkers International Union
v. Misco, Inc.,is which was expected to be the definitive word on the
subject. It was not. As a result, there continues to be disagreement among
the circuit courts as to how expansive--or narrow-the parameters are for
judges to vacate awards on this basis.19 Given that the Court had two
chances within four years to give guidance and that pronounced differences
in interpretation have remained unresolved for almost a decade, it is almost
certain that the Court will not revisit the issue. Instead, there will be splits
between the circuits, and even potentially within the circuits, which will
remain.
This Note examines how the Sixth Circuit has interpreted the public-
policy exception and how its view fits within the broader debate over the
permissible scope of this review. Part II looks at the Supreme Court's
decisions in W.R. Grace and Misco and the ensuing debate over
interpretation in the lower courts. Part III examines the approach of the
Sixth Circuit and concludes that the court has adopted the narrow-review
standard favored by the- D.C. and Ninth Circuits. Part IV examines the
potential bases upon which the Sixth Circuit's public-policy jurisprudence is
based and argues that it coincides with developments in the law surrounding
arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act-the development of the so-
called "second Trilogy" that began in the mid-eighties. 20 Part V concludes.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 25-28 (discussing other grounds for challenge).
16 REsTATBm OF CONTRACTS §§ 512, 598 (1922); 6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 1373 (1962); 3 SAMuEL L. WILUSTON, THe LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1628
(1922).
17 W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757
(1983).
18 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
19 See infra notes 44-77 (discussing the debate in the circuit courts).
20 See David E. Feller, End of the Trilogy: The Declining State of Labor Arbitration,
ARB. J., Sept. 1993, at 19 (citing Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: 7he
Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305 (1985)).
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II. THE PUBLIC-POLICY EXCEPTION TO AWARD ENFORCEMENT
A. W.R. Grace and Misco
In Enterprise Wheel 21 the Court set forth the proper role for a court in
reviewing an arbitration award:
The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award
is the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining
agreements. The federal policy of settling labor disputes by
arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the
merits of the awards. 22
Further, the Court stated that a court may not reconsider the merits of an
award even when the parties allege that the award rests upon an error in
fact-finding or a misinterpretation of the contract: "As long as the arbitrator
is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the
scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error
does not suffice to overturn his decision."23 The degree of deference that
courts are to give to a challenged arbitration award is described as "one of
the narrowest standards of judicial review in all of American
jurisprudence. " 24
This does not, of course, mean that there are no means by which a
court can review an award. The Court noted in Enterprise Wheel that "when
the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to [the obligation to interpret
the terms of the agreement], courts have no choice but to refuse
21 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
22 Enteprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596. "The function of the court is very limited when
the parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. It is
confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its
face is governed by the contract. Whether the moving party was right or wrong is a question
of contract interpretation for the arbitrator. In these circumstances the moving party should
not be deprived of the arbitrator's judgment, when it was his judgment and all that it connotes
that was bargained for." United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68
(1960) (emphasis added).
23 Mlsco, 484 U.S. at 38 (1987) ("Courts thus do not sit to hear claims of factual or
legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of lower
courts.*).
24 Lattimer-Stevens Co. v. United Steelworkers, Dist. 27, 913 F.2d 1166, 1169 (6th
Cir. 1990).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
enforcement of the award. " 25 Likewise, parties cannot be forced to arbitrate
matters which they have not agreed to arbitrate. 26 In addition, the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) 27 provides that courts may vacate awards when there
is the presence of fraud, misconduct, or bias on the part of the arbitrator or
the parties. 28 Review in these situations protects the integrity of the parties'
25 Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597. "[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and
application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand
of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is
legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." Id.
See also Cement Diva., National Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers, Local 135, 793 F.2d
759, 766 (6th Cir. 1986) (setting forth a four-part test to determine an arbitrator's fidelity to
the parties' contract).
26 AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648-49
(1986); United Steelworkers v. Mead Corp., Fine Paper Div., 21 F.3d 128, 131-32 (6th Cir.
1994); see also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995) (holding
that the Federal Arbitration Act provides that courts are to decide arbitrability issues absent a
clear indication that the parties intended that the arbitrator decide them).
27 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
28 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (1995) (courts may vacate an award when "there was evident
partiality or corruption in the arbitrators"); 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (1995) (courts may vacate an
award procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means). Although there is disagreement as to
its actual application, see infra this note, the Supreme Court noted that courts "have often
looked to the Act for guidance in labor arbitration cases." Misco, 484 U.S. at 40 n.9 (1987).
This has long been the practice of the Sixth Circuit, with the result that there are several cases
interpreting the FAA in the labor context. E.g., Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d
1344, 1353 n.9, 1358 (6th Cir. 1989) (adopting "reasonable person" standard in judging
partiality), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990).
As previously noted, there is a split in the circuits as to the applicability of the FAA to
arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements, due to language in the Act which
makes it inapplicable to "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class or workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1995). See
genera/y IAN R. MACNEIL Er AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW §§ 11.1-11.7 (1995)
(discussing issues surrounding applicability). The Sixth Circuit recently distinguished a line of
labor and employment cases and stated that the FAA does apply to all employment contracts,
except for those pertaining to employees in the transportation industry. Asplundh Tree Expert
Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 1995) (individual employment contract held to be subject
to FAA). This case may not control in the labor context, however, because discussion of the
applicability of the FAA to collective bargaining agreements was dictum. For a Sixth Circuit
case explicitly holding that the FAA is inapplicable to collective bargaining agreements, see
Bacashihua v. United States Postal Serv., 859 F.2d 402, 404-05 (6th Cir. 1988) (distinguished
in Bates).
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bargain from the chance encounter with a renegade arbitrator or from a
fraudulent determination.
In 1983, the Court recognized the applicability of a public policy
exception to the general rule of judicial deference to the arbitral award. 29 In
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, United Rubber Workers,30 the Court stated
that courts may refuse to enforce collective bargaining agreements-and by
implication arbitral awards that derive from them-that run contrary to
public policy. At issue in W.R. Grace was a conciliation agreement entered
into by the employer which settled an EEOC investigation into violations of
federal civil rights law. The agreement, however, caused some employees to
lose seniority, and the employees' union grieved this loss of seniority. An
arbitrator found that the employer's action had violated the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the union and
ordered that the employer compensate the employees for this loss. The
employer sought judicial review of the arbitrator's award, alleging that the
award violated public policy and was therefore unenforceable by the Court.
The policies alleged to have been violated were: 1) obedience to judicial
orders and 2) voluntary compliance with Title VII.
The Supreme Court agreed with the employer that there does exist a
public-policy exception to a court's enforcement of the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement, including those manifested by means of an
arbitrator's findings and award. The Court's opinion made clear that this
was not any new exception to the rule of deference established in Enterprise
Wheel, but rather that the federal courts have always had the obligation to
refuse to enforce contracts that violate an "explicit public policy." The
Court attempted to define this amorphous concept as a policy "well defined
and dominant, and... ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal
precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public
interests.' 31 Although the Court noted that both policies proffered by the
employer passed the test the Court put forth, it held that neither of them
would be violated by enforcement of the arbitration award. As the Court
stated, "[t]he dilemma... was of the company's own making" in that it
voluntarily committed itself to "conflicting contractual obligations," which,
29 This is not to suggest that soma courts had not understood there to be such an
exception previously. E.g., United Auto Workers, Local 985 v. W.M. Chace Co., 262 F.
Supp. 114, 117-18 (E.D. Mich. 1966) ("[lt is too plain for argument that no court will order
a party to do something, if in order to comply with the court's directive, he must commit a
crime.").
30 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
31 Id. at 757 (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945) (noting that
"there must be found definite indications in the law of the sovereignty to justify the
invalidation of a contract as contrary to that policy.*).
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while painful to the company, did not require it to violate Title VII or the
court order in the case. 32
Although W.R. Grace did not appear to sanction a broad exception to
Enterprise Wheel,33 this is not how many litigants interpreted it.34
Following the Court's decision, "it seemed as though the floodgates to the
federal courts had opened wide"35 with challenges to arbitral awards on the
grounds of a perceived conflict with one public policy or another. Just four
years later, with the circuit courts in conflict as to when courts may use this
"new" exception to vacate awards, the Supreme Court revisited its holding
in W.R. Grace.
At issue in Misco36 was the discharge of an employee of a paper mill in
Louisiana for violating a company rule against workplace possession or
consumption of illegal drugs. The employee's union grieved his discharge,
claiming that the employer lacked authority under the collective bargaining
agreement, i.e., just cause, to discharge the employee in this circumstance.
The matter went to arbitration, as provided for in the agreement. The
arbitrator found that cause was lacking and awarded the employee
reinstatement with backpay. The company filed suit against the union in
district court seeking to vacate the award on the grounds that ordering the
employee reinstated violated the "public policy against drugs in the
workplace." The district judge agreed and vacated the award. 37 The union
then appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed. The Fifth Circuit
opinion decried the arbitrator's "whimsical" decision: "Gazing at the trees,
and oblivious of the forest, the arbitrator has entered an award that is
plainly contrary to serious and well-founded public policy."38 The court
32 W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 767-70.
33 "It is not at all clear that the reference to 'public policy' in W.R. Grace denotes
anything more or different than what the courts have said over the years in construing
Enterprise Wheel." American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d
1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted).
34 Its popularity may also derive from the fact that it is often the only argument the
obstinate party may invoke to challenge an award because it may be used even after the statute
of limitations has run. This is because it derives not from a right possessaed by a party, but
rather from a court's jurisdictional limit. See Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Int'l Chem. Workers
Union, 853 F.2d 1310, 1317 (6th Cir. 1988).
35 William B. Gould IV, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards-Thiry Years of
the Steelworkers Trilogy: 7he Afternath of AT&T and Misco, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 464,
477 (1989).
36 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
37 Id. at 34.
38 Misco, Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 768 F.2d 739, 743 (5th Cir. 1985),
rev'd, 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
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found the Muschany requirement of a well-defined and dominant public
policy satisfied by reference to "the Louisiana law against possession of
marijuana and the public policy, embodied in the employer's rule, against
introduction of drugs in the -workplace and consequent operation of
dangerous machinery by persons under their influence." 39 The union
appealed to the Supreme Court, which unanimously reversed.
The question on which the Court granted review was the union's
contention that a court may refuse to enforce an award on public policy
grounds only when the award itself violates a statute, regulation, or other
manifestation of positive law or compels conduct by the employer that
would violate the law.40 The Court did not address that contention,
41
however, instead re-emphasizing that the general rule, per Enterprise
Wheel, is deferral and that courts can use the public-policy exception only
when the conditions of W.R. Grace are met. The Court pointed out that
W.R. Grace did not "sanction a broad judicial power to set aside arbitration
awards as against public policy." 42 The Court also noted that the Fifth
Circuit's position placed it within the group of circuits which sanctioned
"broad review," as contrasted with narrow-review circuits like the D.C.
Circuit, although it did not specifically take issue with this.43 The Court
simply held that no well-defined and dominant public policy was shown to
be subject to violation if the award was enforced; mere citation to the drug
laws of Louisiana was insufficient. Accordingly, the Court reversed.
B. The Public Policy Exception 'Defined" Post-Misco
Because the Court did not explicitly adopt one of the varied approaches
that had been theretofore used by the circuit courts in defining the scope of
review, the confusion remains. While there is a great variety of approaches
among the circuits (and even seemingly between panels of the same
circuit),44 there are really just two approaches: broad review and narrow
3 9 Misco, 768 F.2d at 741.
40 Brief for Petitioners, United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29
(1987) (No. 86-651).
4 1 Misco, 484 U.S. at 45 n.12 ("We need not address the Union's position .....
4 2
rd. at 43.
43 Id. at 35 n.7 (noting that the Fifth Circuit's decision placed it within the group of
courts holding a 'broader view" of the exception). The author believes that casting the
approach of the Fifth Circuit within the group advocating broad review, while acknowledging
the presence of another group advocating narrow review, indicates a preference for the latter.
This is, however, pure conjecture.
44 Both the Third and Eleventh Circuits, at least, have case law containing contradictory
reasoning.
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review. The former can be characterized as viewing the W.R. Grace and
Misco cases as announcing a new rule in the federal common-law
development of labor arbitration. Within this group there seems to be
differing analyses, but it is often difficult to nail down exactly what is going
on since "public policy" is such a slippery, amorphous concept. In general,
those circuits using a broad review interpret the Supreme Court's opinion in
Misco as imposing a technical requirement on the lower courts; specific
laws must be cited in defining the public policy. Less emphasis is placed on
the violation step. Courts adhering to this view, to one degree or another,
appear to include the First,45 Second,46 Third,47 Fifth,48 Eighth,49 and
Eleventh Circuits. 50
The narrow-review theory sees W.R. Grace and Misco as setting forth a
very restricted standard for courts to employ in reviewing awards. A
common characteristic of these courts is that they strictly employ the Misco
admonition that the public policy must actually be violated by the award. As
a result, there are strange, non-commonsensical arbitral results which are
nonetheless enforced because this is the contracted-for result, not because
the arbitrator enjoys any common sense. If it is not the contracted-for result,
it may be attacked based on the grounds mentioned earlier, but not because
of a supposed public policy conflict. Proponents of generally narrow review
45 C. North Adams Reg. Hosp. v. Mass. Nurses Ass'n, 74 F.3d 346 (1st Cir. 1996).
46 Cf. Newsday Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, No. 915, 915 F.2d 840 (2d
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 922 (1991).
47 E.g., Exxon Corp. v. Baton Rouge Oil & Chem. Workers Union, 77 F.3d 346 (5th
Cir. 1996).
4 8 E.g., Gulf Coast Indus. Workers Union v. Exxon Co., 991 F.2d 244 (5th Cir.), cerl.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 441 (1993).
49 E.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 3 F.3d 255 (8th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 881 (1994).
5 0 E.g., Georgia Power Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 84, 707 F. Supp. 531
(N.D. Ga. 1989) (but purporting to adopt narrow approach), afl'd, 896 F.2d 507 (1 1th Cir.
1990).
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appear to include the Fourth,5 1 Seventh,5 2 Ninth, 53 Tenth,54 and D.C.
Circuits. 55
The distinction between the broad and narrow-review courts can be
illustrated by comparing the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Delta Air Lines v.
Air Line Pilots Association56 and the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Northwest
Airlines v. Air Line Pilots Association.57 The benefit of comparison results
from the facts of the two cases being completely indistinguishable. In short,
each case concerned a commercial airline pilot who performed the duties of
a co-pilot while still intoxicated from heavy drinking the night before. In
each case, the pilot was given blood tests to determine intoxication, and in
each case the pilot was legally drunk under state law. Because of their
actions, the pilots were discharged for violating federal regulations and
company policies. Each pilot's union contested his discharge, contending
that the airline did not have just cause to terminate, and that he should have
been offered the chance to enter rehabilitation. In both cases, the arbitration
panels voted to reinstate the employee without backpay or benefits, upon
condition that he regain FAA certification to fly. The employers then filed
suits in federal court seeking to prevent enforcement of the awards.
5 8
At this point, the similarity ends since the courts came out differently.
Although each found the arbitration panels to have acted properly and
within their contractual authority, they split on the issue of public policy.
The D.C. Circuit found the airline's argument on this issue to be
"meritless." 59 Relying upon the Supreme Court's W.R. Grace opinion and
in earlier decision, 6° the court examined whether the award at issue violated
public policy as divined from positive law and found that it did not.
51 C. Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Local 1503, 125 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) 10,687 (4th Cir. 1993).
52 C Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Int'l Union, Allied Indus. Workers, 959 F.2d 685 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 908 (1992).
53 E.g., United Food & Comm. Workers Int'l Union, Local 588 v. Foster Poultry
Farms, 74 F.3d 169 (9th Cir. 1995).
54 Cf. Communication Workers v. Southeastern Elec. Coop., 882 F.2d 467 (10th Cir.
1989).
55 E.g., American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 52 F.3d 359,
362-63 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
56 861 F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1988), cent. denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989).
57 808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1014 (1988). Although decided
before MLsco, the court has retained the same analysis in later cases.
58 Delta AirLines, 861 F.2d at 666-69; Northwest Airlines, 808 F.2d at 78-80.
59 Northwest Airlines, 808 F.2d at 82.
60 American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.
1986).
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Specifically, the court examined the reinstatement requirement and noted
that it was made contingent upon the pilot regaining FAA certification to fly
and was thus not illegal: "It would be the height of judicial chutzpah for us
to second-guess the present judgment of the FAA recertifying Morrison for
flight duty." 61 While noting the employer's need for reasonable safety rules
(and the egregiousness of the employee's conduct), 62 the court noted that it
was free to insist on removal of arbitral jurisdiction over cases involving the
rules in bargaining with the union. Accordingly, the award was enforced.
The Eleventh Circuit, as noted above, employed a different analysis.
Rather than being meritless, it found the employer's argument to concern
the "rare example" of an award, the enforcement of which would violate
public policy. 63 The court attached a great deal of significance to the fact
that the employee here was intoxicated while at work, finding that this
distinguished the case from Misco and a prior Eleventh Circuit case.
64
Further, the court stated that the arbitrator here had construed the contract
such that "Delta has agreed to submit to arbitration the question as to
whether it should authorize operation of aircraft by pilots while they are
drunk."65 However, the reinstatement of the employee here was again
conditioned upon recertification by the FAA; no one argued Delta had to let
drunks fly the planes. Nevertheless, the court proceeded to analyze legal
pronouncements to support its holding. It found state laws criminalizing
operation of an aircraft while intoxicated, federal regulations forbidding
intoxicated individuals from flying, and caselaw discussing the important
public policy underlying safety. In addressing the violation step, the court
found it satisfied due to an ability to discover any legal authority stating that
the employee's actions are consistent with public policy. "Delta . . .was
under a duty to prevent the wrongdoing of which its Pilot-In-Command was
guilty, and it could not agree to arbitrate that issue. "66 The court thus found
Misco satisfied because of the employee's conduct, exactly the inquiry it
stated at the outset it was not undertaking.
The essential difference in the cases is the application of the violation
step. The D.C. Circuit found plenty of public policies implicated by the
employee's conduct, but none violated because enforcement of the award
would not create a conflict with the policy. The Eleventh Circuit, on the
61 Northwest Airlines, 808 F.2d at 83.
62 Id. at 33 n.84.
63 Delta Air Lines, 861 F.2d at 671.
64 Florida Power Corp. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 847 F.2d 680 (1 Ith Cir. 1988)
(holding that reinstatement of employee discharged for off-duty possession of cocaine does not
violate public policy).
65 Delta Air Lines, 861 F.2d at 671.
66Id. at 674.
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other hand, apparently found that the public policy announced in the laws
could be violated even without a conflict. This is the essential trait of the
broad-review courts: it is the ideal that emanates from the cited laws that
forms the relevant public policy. 67 In Gulf Coast Industrial Workers Union
v. Exxon Co., 68 the Fifth Circuit attempted to demonstrate how the arbitral
reinstatement of an employee discharged for cocaine use violated public
policy by reviewing federal and state statutes, regulations, and judicial
precedents which "condemn the presence of drugs in the workplace." 69
Among the statutes cited was the Americans with Disabilities Act because
drug users are not protected under the Act.70 While Exxon would not have
been required to perform an illegal act by bringing the employee back to
work on its own initiative or indeed for failing to discharge him in the first
place, the Fifth Circuit refused enforcement of the award. The result of
cases like this is that an employer is "left holding all the cards." 7 1
Although this approach is the majority view, the narrow-review
approach has the overwhelming support of academic commentators72 and is
the majority view of state courts to consider the issue under state collective
bargaining schemes. 73 In a recent article, Professor Clyde Summers set forth
67 Cf Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seaman's Union, 993 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1993) (in
addition to vacation where award violates positive law or requires a party to act illegally,
vacation is required when award undercuts or thwarts stated purpose behind statute or
regulation).
68 991 F.2d 244 (5th Cir.), cen. denied, 114 S. Ct. 441 (1993).
69 Id. at 250-55.
70 Gulf Coast Indus., 991 F.2d at 251.
71 "If, on the one hand, it wishes to retain an employee who [acts improperly], the
courts cannot 'stand in the way.' If, on the other hand, it wishes to ignore a contractual
provision requiring it to retain an employee, or a 'just cause' provision requiring it to submit
grievances over safety-related discharges to binding arbitration, it will find relief in the courts
[of the broad-review circuits]." Harry T. Edwards, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration
Awards: The Clash Between the Public Policy Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 3, 28 (1988) (footnote omitted).
72 See, e.g., id., Ray, supra note 12; but see Jesse P. Schaudies, Jr. & Christopher S.
Miller, The Critical Role of a Judicially Recognized Public Policy Against Illegal Drug Use in
the Workplace, 12 INDUS. REL.. L.J 153 (1990).
73 E.g., American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Illinois Dept. of
Mental Health, 529 N.E.2d 534, 540-42 (11. 1988); Inlandboatmen's Union of the Pacific v.
Sause Bros., Inc., 881 P.2d 1255, 1261-64 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994); Lansing Comm. College
v. Lansing Comm. College Chapter of Mich. Ass'n for Higher Edn., 409 N.W.2d 823 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1987), aff'd on remand, 429 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding
reinstatement of professor discharged for smoking marijuana with students and adopting strict
violation requirement). But see Mass. Hwy Dep't v. American Ped'n of State, County and
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two criteria he believed were necessary before an award is vacated on
public-policy grounds. "First, the reinstatement should create a substantial
threat for the future; it should not be set aside to penalize for the past." 74
This means that "[plublic policy must be a policy which bars reinstatement"
in that situation. 75 This is the approach of the narrow-review courts.
"Second, the interest to be protected by the court is the public's interest, not
the employer's private interest."76 Professor Summers notes, however, that
adoption of these principles, particularly the second, by a court will not
necessarily restrain the court as its action can be phrased such that it
obfuscates, albeit unintentionally, its true action. 77
III. PUBLIC POLICY IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
The Sixth Circuit has the "reputation for vacating more arbitration
awards than any other circuit."78 Given this, one might expect that the court
would join the group of circuits which advocate an expansive view of the
public-policy exception, but in fact the opposite has occurred, as the Sixth
Circuit has adopted a narrow, conservative approach. This section examines
Sixth Circuit decisional law interpreting W.R. Grace and Misco, while the
next section discusses possible explanations for the court's seemingly
differing approaches to public-policy challenges and the other possible
challenges, those which have built the court's reputation. In analyzing the
court's approach, the Note discusses reinstatement cases past and future, as
Mun. Employees, Council 93, 648 N.E.2d 430 (Mass. 1995); Southwest Ohio Reg. Transit
Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 627, No. C-930423, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS
4319 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 28, 1994) (seemingly adopting broad review).
74 Clyde W. Summers, The Trilogy and its Offspring Revisited: It's a Contract, Stupid,
71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1021, 1054 (1993).
75 Id. at 1054-55 (emphasis in original).
76 Id. at 1055.
77 Summers, supra note 74, at 1055. See, e.g., Gulf Coast Indus., discussed supra note
68, where court focuses upon the public hazard posed by a cocaine-using employee working
at an oil refinery, rather than the employer's self-interest in firing him.
78 Herbert L. Segal, The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and
Arbitration Awards, in FOURTH ANNUAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW INSTITUTE 206
(Marlin M. Volz ed., 1988). It is estimated that the court vacated about half the arbitration
awards presented to it in the mid-1980's. Michael H. Gottesman, Enforceability of Awards: A
Union Viewpoint, in ARBITRATION 1988: EMBRGING ISSUES FOR THE 1990's 88, 89 (Gladys
W. Gruenberg ed., 1989). But see LeRoy & Feuille, supra note 13, at 105 (finding in
empirical study that in the thirty years since the Trilogy, district courts in the sixth circuit
enforced awards 72.1% of the time, with the court of appeals enforcing 62.9%; this places the
sixth circuit courts below the median, but not at the bottom).
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well as cases founded upon other, non-discharge related provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement.
The majority of public-policy cases that seem to find their way to the
Sixth Circuit, and indeed to any court, deal with the ordered reinstatement
of employees originally discharged for alleged misconduct. 79 The seminal
Sixth Circuit case post-Misco is Interstate Brands Corp. v. Chauffeurs,80
which, like many of the reinstatement cases, deals with the arbitral
reinstatement of an employee discharged for drug use. The employee, a
delivery driver for a bread company, was a passenger in a car pulled over
by police near the Cincinnati airport in northern Kentucky on his day off.
The officer approached the car and found the employee "in a disoriented
condition with slurred speech and alcohol on his breath," and, moreover,
with cocaine, blood, and needle marks on his arm.81 The officer arrested
him for possession of cocaine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia, all
violations of Kentucky law. The prosecutor subsequently offered to drop the
charges on condition that he undergo drug rehabilitation, which he did. The
individual's employer was not immediately informed, but discharged him
indefinitely when it was notified. The employee's union grieved the
dismissal up to arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement's
"just cause" requirement for dismissal. The arbitrator found that the
employee had indeed used cocaine (something that was contested since he
was never actually convicted of possession), but ordered the employee
reinstated as the employer had no policy against off-duty drug use by its
employees. 82 The employer refused to comply with the award and sued he
union in district court seeking its vacation. The district court vacated the
award, stating in dicta that the reinstatement of the employee "violated a
well-defined public policy against permitting habitual users of mind-altering
drugs from operating motor vehicles." 83 The union appealed to the Sixth
Circuit, which reversed.
The Sixth Circuit stated that the lower court mischaracterized the issue
and "was in actuality evaluating [the employee's] behavior," instead of
determining whether the award, "the contract as interpreted," violated
79 A provision found in most collective bargaining agreements is that the employer can
discharge an employee only for "just cause." FRANK ELKOuRI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, HOW
ARBITRATION WoRKs 652 (4th ed. 1985).
80 909 F.2d 885 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991).
81 Interstate Brands, 909 F.2d at 887.
82 Id. at 888.
83 Id. The district court cited the laws of Indiana, Kentucky, and Ohio (all of which had
connection to the employee's delivery routes) prohibiting driving under the influence of
intoxicants.
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some explicit public policy.84 The court first determined that there was no
public policy at stake. While each state did prohibit persons from driving
while under the influence of intoxicants, none of them prohibited someone
who had been convicted of this offense from ever driving again; such
person was only prohibited from driving while his or her license was
revoked. 85 Likewise, the court stated that there is no general public policy
against "reinstating an employee [initially] discharged for being intoxicated
while off-duty, or arrested for off-duty possession of controlled
substances." 8 6 Because no public policy was at stake, the inquiry ended
without the court having to determine the violation step. 87
While the court would not categorize itself with respect to the debate in
the circuits as to the scope of the policy that can be considered and what
constitutes a violation,8 8 it seems to have done so in the following two
cases. In Monroe Auto Equipment Co. v. United Auto Workers, Local
878,89 an employer appealed the district court's confirmation of an
arbitration award that ordered it to reinstate an employee discharged for
alleged drug use. Among other grounds, the employer argued that
reinstatement of the employee violated public policy by "ordering
reinstatement and return to the workplace of an employee who admitted
using illegal drugs. " 9° The Sixth Circuit disagreed, however, stating that
this was insufficient in that the employer had failed to "identify law or legal
precedents which indicate that the award violated a well defined and
dominant public policy."91 As in Interstate Brands, the court noted the
proper inquiry is not whether the employee's conduct was improper, but
"whether the arbitrator's award requiring reinstatement of the grievant...
84 Imerstate Brands, 909 F.2d at 893.
85 Id. at 894 (citing to the relevant state laws).
86 Interstate Brands, 909 F.2d at 894.
87 The court also criticized the district court for considering the employee's convictions
for reckless driving and DUI on two occasions as part of its public-policy analysis. The
arbitrator "made note" of these but determined they were too remote from the incident. It was
improper for the district court to consider these because questions of admissibility of evidence
are procedural matters to be determined by the arbitrator. Because the arbitrator found them
irrelevant, the district court was bound by that determination. Interstate Brands, 909 F.2d at
894.
88 Id. at 893-94 n.l 1 (noting the split between the Eighth and Ninth Circuits but finding
a factual distinction in the case subjudice and refusing to announce a position).
89 981 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 931 (1993).
90Id. at 265.
91 Id. at 269.
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violated some explicit public policy."92 In short, there was again no public
policy found.
In Shelby County Health Care Corp. v. American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, Local 1733,93 the court addressed the
violation step. The court was faced with an employer's challenge to an
arbitrator's award reinstating an employee discharged for her participation
in an illegal strike at the employer's facility. Specifically, the strike was
conducted in violation of the notice requirements of the 1974 Health Care
Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act. Following the
employee's discharge, the union grieved the dismissal up to arbitration. The
arbitrator reinstated her, citing her long service with the company and the
fact that he did not believe she was the chief instigator of the strike. The
hospital challenged the award in district court on the grounds that the award
violated the public policy established in the Health Care Amendments,
which prohibits strikes without notice and provides that employees who
illegally strike lose their "employee status," allowing them to be fired by
their employer. 94 The employer argued that the award contravened the
statute by not allowing discharge of the employee. The district court agreed,
stating that these provisions constituted a well-defined and dominant public
policy and that the award directly contravened this policy by not allowing
the employer to discharge this employee.95 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit
agreed that the statutory provisions constituted a public policy but disagreed
with the district court as to whether there was a violation.96 The court noted
that the employee's conduct did indeed run afoul of the NLRA, but that the
cited provisions did not remove the employer's discretion in retaining or
discharging those employees who illegally strike. Because the employer
retained its discretion under the law, that it chose to bargain that away by
agreeing to a grievance procedure is not something that concerns public
policy. In other words, the award did not compel a violation of law. The
case was remanded with instructions to enforce the award. 97
There are other reinstatement situations that the court has yet to review.
Two of the most litigated situations deal with sexual harassment and public-
safety concerns. First, the arbitral reinstatement of an employee discharged
92 Monroe, 981 F.2d at 269 (quoting Interstate Brands, 909 F. 2d at 893).
9 967 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1992).
94 Shelby County Health Care, 967 F.2d at 1092 (citing National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(d), (158)(g) (1994)).
95 Shelby County Health Care Corp. v. American Fed'n of State, County and Mun.
Employees, Local 1733, 756 F. Supp. 349, 352 (W.D. Tenn. 1991).
96 Shelby County Health Care, 967 F.2d at 1096.
9 7 Id. at 1098.
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for sexual harassment has become a contentious issue in the circuits. 98 The
courts that have addressed it have split, essentially over differing
interpretations of the breadth of the public-policy exception. The Third
Circuit, for instance, found that Title VII creates a W.R. Grace-style public
policy against sexual harassment in the workplace that is violated by the
arbitral reinstatement of a harasser. 99 This conclusion runs contrary to the
analysis used in the Sixth Circuit, however, where no violation can occur
unless the award itself violates public policy. If the employer is under a
legal obligation to rid itself of that particular employee, or if the arbitrator
reinstates the employee while finding that the employee will most likely
again perpetrate harassment, then the court might find that such an award
will not be enforced. The assertion, however, that reinstatement of a
harasser might subject the employer to Title VII liability for maintaining a
hostile workplace environment should not be sufficient because the
employer is free to make violation of a sexual harassment policy mandatory
cause for discharge in the collective bargaining agreement.10° Given the
opportunity to review such a case, the Sixth Circuit should be expected to
follow its Interstate Brands analysis.
Another situation that has not been squarely addressed by the court is
what has been styled as the "public safety," public-policy case, where
reinstatement of an employee who acted negligently at work is alleged to be
unenforceable because public safety is endangered.101 It is, of course,
important for courts to consider the public's interest when a private
contract, such as a collective bargaining agreement, creates significant
98 Compare Newsday, 915 F.2d 840 (victim a co-worker, violates public policy) and
Stroehmann Bakeries v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir.) (victim
an employee of customer; violates public policy), cen. denied, 506 U.S. 1022 (1992); United
Transp. Union v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 864 F. Supp. 138 (D. Or. 1994) (victim a co-
worker; violates public policy) with Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1992)
(victim a co-worker; does not violate public policy) and Southeastern Elec. Coop., 882 F.2d
467 (10th Cir. 1989) (victim a customer;, no violation) See also Chris Baker, Comment,
Sexual Harassment v. Labor Arbitration: Does Reinstating Sexual Harassers Violate Public
Policy?, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 1361 (1993) (addressing both sides and concluding that there is
not a public-policy violation).
99 Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1441 (2-1 decision).
100 See Edwards, supra note 71, at 28-29. The employer must be careful, however, that
this is specifically established in the agreement and should not be a matter that is subject to
arbitral review. Bruce Hardwood Floors v. Southern Council of Indus. Workers, 8 F.3d 1104
(6th Cir. 1993). Contra Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. District 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial
Ass'n, 889 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1989) (allowing less discretion on part of arbitrator in finding
discretion at edges of agreement), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 (1990).
101 E.g., Delta Airlines, 861 F.2d 665; Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local Union
204, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987) (reinstatement of nuclear
power employee who violated safety rule at plant violates policy favoring public safety).
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externalities felt by the public at large. 102 A narrow approach does not,
however, amount to an abrogation of the concern judges have in watching
out for the interests of society. Both parties, the employer and the union,
have operated in an area of private law carved out for them by Congress,
and it is the employer, not society, that will suffer from the employer's
agreement to have its authority to discharge tempered by a "just cause"
requirement and arbitration. Some courts, however, have been receptive to
employer allegations of threats to public safety and have used Misco as a
back door means of refusing to enforce awards reinstating employees who
were discharged for committing admittedly negligent acts. 103 This technique
is often used in drug cases, where an award reinstating a drug-using
employee is not enforced because of concern that an industrial accident
could occur in the future due to his intoxication. In other words, these
courts are again focusing upon the employee's conduct, rather than the real
issue: does the award-not the conduct-violate public policy? 104
This is how the Sixth Circuit will likely frame the issue in this situation
and others that will arise in the future. This analysis has been summarized
as follows: "If under a given collective bargaining regime, higher
management would have the legal right to reverse an initial decision to
discharge an employee because of conduct violating public policy, then an
arbitrator's award to the same effect, if based on the contract, should be
enforced." 10 S In other words, if the employer has agreed to a just cause
102 Stephen R. Reinhardt, Arbitration and the Courts: Is the Honeymoon Over?, in
ARBITRATION 1987: THE ACADEMY AT FORTY 25, 27-29 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 1988)
(noting judicial concern).
103 See Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 843 F.2d 357 (9th
Cir. 1988) (holding that policy favoring public safety prohibited reinstatement of auto
mechanic discharged for failure to tighten customers' wheel lugnuts), rev'd, 886 F.2d 1200
(9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 946 (1990).
104 7Tis is how lower courts in the Sixth Circuit have addressed it. See, e.g., Local 223,
Utility Workers Union v. Detroit Edison Co., No. 89-CV-72065-DT, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19708 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 1990) (rejecting magistrate's recommended order and holding
that award reinstating employee discharged for falsifying information did not violate the cited
public policy "requiring the operation of a nuclear power plant in a safe manner"). A pre-
Interstate Brands court came to a different conclusion, but its analysis did not survive that
case. Russell Memorial Hosp. Ass'n v. United Steelworkers, 720 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Mich.
1989) (award reinstating nurse discharged for negligent administration of medicine to patient
violated Michigan's public policy of "ensuring safe and competent nursing care" as
manifested through laws regulating the profession in general).
105 Frank Easterbrook, Arbitration, Contract, and Public Policy, in ARBrrRATION 1991:
THE CHANGING FACE OF THEORY AND PRACTICE (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 1992), quoted In
David E. Feller, Court Review ofArbitration, 43 LAB. LJ. 539, 543 (1992).
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standard for dismissal of employees, then it in effect delegates to the
arbitrator, subject to the conditions of the collective bargaining agreement,
its authority to discharge employees. It does not matter that the employee
himself has committed an improper or an illegal act. 1 6 Unless the employer
itself could not lawfully retain the employee, then the arbitrator's award
does not violate public policy. This approach, i.e., requiring the presence of
a law or legal precedent as policy and then requiring that the award itself
compel a violation of the policy, places it within the minority of the
circuits. The Sixth Circuit, as noted by the above opinions, has explicitly
rejected the broad approach, which takes otherwise lawful subjects out of
the field of bargaining. 1 07
The court did not limit its holdings in Interstate Brands, Monroe, and
Shelby County to reinstatement cases; those cases are derived from the
position established initially in W.R. Grace and are geared to general
subject matter applicability. W.R. Grace itself was not a reinstatement case,
but dealt rather with seniority rights, another common provision in a
collective bargaining agreement. Thus, the analysis used in those cases
should be used in all public-policy cases, and in fact has been. These cases
often involve issues much more important to the parties involved than the
reinstatement of a given employee. This section looks at these other
situations, some of them pre-Interstate Brands, in which an arbitrator's
award enforcing these provisions was alleged to violate public policy.
One such situation is where an arbitrator's award is struck down as
violating public policy because the award (and by necessary implication, the
contract) runs afoul of the NLRA. This situation has occurred on a number
of occasions and the court has been fairly consistent in its approach.
106 See, e.g., United Auto Workers, Local 771 v. Micro Mfg., 895 F. Supp. 170 (E.D.
Mich. 1995) (finding no public policy violation where an arbitrator ordered reinstatement of
an employee who had illegally assaulted owner of company); Peabody Coal Co. v. United
Mine Workers, Local Union No. 1188, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2270 (S.D. Ohio 1985)
(arbitration award reinstating employee found to have stolen company property is not contrary
to public policy, even though employee surely violated criminal law). In an earlier,
unpublished case in which the Sixth Circuit reviewed such misconduct, it used the Interstate
Brands analysis, even though it predated that case. Joseph & Feiss Co. v. Amalgamated
Clothing and Textile Workers Union, No. 87-3832, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 14898 (6th Cir.
Nov. 8, 1988) (reinstatement of employee discharged for proven unemployment-compensation
fraud did not violate a public policy, even though employee's conduct was illegal).
107 See, e.g., Premium Bldg. Prods. Co. v. United Steelworkers, Local Union No.
8869, No. 85-3749, 798 F.2d 1415 (6th Cir. 1986) (table, text available in LEXIS) ("The
company acknowledges that neither the district court nor this court can establish a per se
ruling that anyone caught smoking marijuana at his workplace is subject to discharge in all
cases."), afflg 616 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
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Essentially, an award that compels a party to violate the Act is
unenforceable.108 This situation can be litigated two ways. A party may
refuse to submit a question to arbitration because it pertains to an illegal
contract term. The Sixth Circuit has held that relief will be granted only "if
the contract clause 'on its face violates federal labor law or is contrary to
federal labor policy.' . . . Arbitration will not be precluded unless 'all
possible interpretations of the contract provision would result in a conflict
with federal labor law. ' "10 9 In other words, it must be clear that the
arbitrator could not have read the language in such a way as to make the
result of the language not illegal.
Because of this, in most of these situations, the obstinate party waits
until after the award has been rendered before provoking a court challenge
under public policy. In Professional Administrators Ltd. v. Kopper-Glo
Fuel,11° a pre-Interstate Brands case, an employer challenged an arbitration
award which affirmed the right of pension fund trustees to increase the
amount of contributions the employer was required to make to the fund.
The applicable collective bargaining agreement, as interpreted by the
arbitrator, gave the trustees this power. The employer argued that the
provision of the contract which purportedly allowed for this was
unenforceable as against public policy. The Sixth Circuit, relying upon
Supreme Court precedent defining the role of pension trustees, agreed
stating that the trustees had usurped the power of the employer as to a
mandatory subject of bargaining, in contravention of the NLRA. 111 The
court held that it was of no importance that the employer had initially
agreed to the provision. 112
The court addressed the public-policy dimensions of delegated
bargaining over mandatory subjects again in Local 58, International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Southeast Michigan Chapter, National
108 J.L. Foti Constr. Co. v. Laborers Int'l Union, Local No. 310, 742 F.2d 994, 1001
(6th Cir. 1984) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The agreement may not be enforced if to do so
would violate the policy of the NLRA.") (citations omitted). This doctrine is also, of course,
codified in the NLRA with respect to certain terms, e.g., hot cargo agreements: § 8(e) of the
Act states that "any contract or agreement containing such an agreement shall be to such
extent unenforceable and void." 28 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1995).
109 Communications Workers v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 820 F.2d 189, 193-94 (6th
Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
110 819 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1987).
111 Id. at 643 (citing Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)); NLRB v.
Wooster Div., Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) (§ 8(d) duty to bargain in good faith
is limited to the subjects of wages, hours and other conditions of employment).
112 Professional Administrators, 819 F. 2d at 643.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Electrical Contractors Association.113 In this case, the court was confronted
with a different award than was at issue in the previous cases, namely an
interest arbitration award. 114 The parties had reached an impasse in
negotiations for a new contract, so, pursuant to the existing contract, an
arbitrator was summoned to resolve the dispute. The arbitrator ruled in
favor of the employer, and the union challenged the award, alleging, inter
alia, that it violated public policy in two ways: first, that the arbitrator
included two non-mandatory bargaining subjects in the new contract in
violation of federal labor law;115 second, that the award created a new
bargaining unit and imposed a collective bargaining agreement upon these
workers without any showing of majority support for the union, again a
violation of federal labor law.11 6 The union sought vacation of the award.
The Sixth Circuit, as a preliminary matter, noted that the "framework of
analysis" developed to guide the courts in reviewing grievance arbitration
awards, i.e. the Trilogy and its progeny, "is applicable to interest
arbitration with slight modification." 11 7 This framework includes the
necessity that an award not run counter to public-policy concerns. 118 Using
these tools to guide it, the court concluded first that the part of the interest
arbitration award which produced the two items which were non-mandatory
bargaining subjects did violate the public policy found in the Act, and thus
would have to be removed. 119 Next, the court found that the union's
concerns as to its representation of employees who never expressed support
for it did not violate the Act. In sum, only those provisions that violated the
Act were excised, a continuation of the Interstate Brands principle.
This section has presented Sixth Circuit case law setting forth its view
as to when courts may properly refuse to enforce an otherwise valid award
113 43 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995).
114 Interest arbitration differs from grievance arbitration in that the former is used to
resolve disputes between the parties as to what the terms of a new contract shall be, whereas
the latter determines what the existing contract provides shall be done in a particular situation.
See generally ELKouRI & ELKouRI, supra note 79, at 98-101 (discussing use of interest
arbitration).
115 See supra note 113.
116 See International Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann
Texas Corp.), 366 U.S. 731, 737 (1961) (an employer and union may not enter a contract
with respect to workers who have not expressed majority support for the union as their
bargaining representative).
117 Local 58, 43 F.3d at 1030.
118 Id. ("Our review is not complete, however, merely because an award survives a
contractual analysis. We must also review the award in light of federal statutes.").
119 Id. at 1032-33. Accord Sheet Metal Workers Local Union No. 54 v. E.F. Etie Sheet
Metal Co., I F.3d 1464 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1067 (1994) (same).
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on the grounds that it violates public policy. In essence, the court has
adopted the narrow approach espoused by the D.C. and Ninth Circuits. Its
reasons for doing so, seemingly out of character with its reputation, are
explored in the next section.
IV. THE RISE OF THE SECOND TRILOGY AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE
PRESENT READING OF THE FIRST
In a recent article,1 20 Professor David Feller explains the thinking that
went into his and Arthur Goldberg's strategy as they prepared to argue the
Trilogy cases for the Steelworkers in 1960, seeking judicial sanction for
labor arbitration at a time when courts were skeptical or hostile to
arbitration as a means of dispute resolution. While they considered relying
upon the arbitration enforcement provisions of the FAA, 12 1 they decided to
use Section 301 of Taft-Hartley because of possible inapplicability of the
FAA122 and because of judicial hostility to the FAA at that time. The
"major thrust was on the difference between grievance arbitration and
commercial arbitration. Wiko [v. Swan] and commercial arbitration cases,
we argued, were irrelevant." 123 The argument was successful, of course,
and a new era of labor relations was ushered in.
In the meantime, the judicial hostility to the FAA has disappeared,
leading to an arbitration revolution in almost all other areas of the law. The
source of this turnaround is a series of Supreme Court decisions that have
broadened the scope and reach of the FAA and made it a powerhouse of a
statute, reaching to contracts at the limits of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause and finding nearly every claim it encounters arbitrable. 124
Gone are the days (like in 1960) when parties seeking judicial approval of
arbitration avoided invoking the FAA because of the courts' poor
perception of it; today, the Court speaks of a' "liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements." 125 Wiko v. Swan was recently overruled,
allowing for arbitration of statutory claims even in situations where there is
120 David E. Feller, End of the Trilogy: The Declining State of Labor Arbitration, ARB.
J., Sept. 1993, at 18.
121 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (1994) (mandating that the federal courts enforce agreements to
arbitrate and that they stay pending litigation).
122 See supra note 120 for discussion of this possible inapplicability.
123 Feller, supra note 120, at 19.
124 See Stephen L. Hayford, Commercial Arbitration In the Supreme Court 1983 - 1995:
A Sea Change, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1996).
125 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991) (quoting Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
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almost complete lack of any bargaining equality. 126 The Court is holding
parties to the letter of their contractual bargain and will not step in to
referee and help the party who has made a bad choice. The lower federal
courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead in FAA cases and are
reluctant to disrupt the terms of a contract. 127 Feller notes that in light of
this "second Trilogy," the Supreme Court has mandated that lower courts
give greater deference to arbitration in these other cases than to those
arising under the Trilogy.128
The answer to this differential treatment may stem from the different
sources of law for each arbitration scheme and the underlying policies
informing each. 129 Under the FAA, there is escape from arbitration only in
situations where a party has not received a procedurally "pure"
arbitration. 130 This is due to the centrality of contract concepts to the
development of the FAA by the Supreme Court. In a recent article,
Professor Richard Shell argues that the Supreme Court itself has become
increasingly influenced by arguments derived from ideals of economic
efficiency in contract, so much so that he asserts that the Court is more pro-
contract than the Lochner Court. 131 This, he posits, is the theory underlying
the Court's strict development of the FAA and the limited ability of parties
to escape their obligations under such a contract. 132
126 E.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)
(holding that a group of first-time investors, including some who did not speak English, were
required to arbitrate claims that their broker violated federal securities laws because the
contract they signed with the broker contained a hidden arbitration clause).
127 See G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modem Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REv.
431, 483 (1993).
128 Feller, supra note 105, at 542. See also Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of
Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 753, 755 (1990) (same). But
see Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective
on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS
L.J. 1187, 1202-04 (1993) (suggesting that the FAA cases have developed along the lines of
Trilogy concepts).
129 But see Richard L. Trumka, Keeping Miners Out of Work. The Cost of Judicial
Revision of Arbitration Awards, 86 W. VA. L. REV. 705, 714-15 (1984) (arguing that anti-
labor sentiment in the federal judiciary is a prime cause of excessive judicial scrutiny of labor
arbitration awards); Reinhardt, supra note 101, at 37-39 (same); LeRoy & Feuille, supra note
13, at 120 (suggesting the same, but with reservation).
130 See supra note 28 (discussing grounds for escape).
131 Shell, supra note 127, at 436 ("When viewed as a single line of cases and placed in
historical perspective,... the modem Court's approach to contract emerges as a well-
integrated, even radical, aspect of its pro-market jurisprudence.").
132 Id. at 504-06.
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Under the Trilogy, by contrast, there is a bo~y of ever-evolving federal
common law which provides for escape in many more situations. The
different law under the Trilogy is no doubt due to the fact that those cases
were not concerned with eliminating litigation; rather, the concern was for
peaceful co-existence of capital and labor. 133 Because there was no real
congressional guidance, the courts developed the ground rules for the entire
arbitration process as a matter of federal common law. 134 Over the years, of
course, caselaw filled in the cracks that developed in the implementation of
the Trilogy, the courts always mindful that the alternative to peaceful labor
relations through collective bargaining and arbitration was industrial
warfare, perhaps of the type which caused havoc in much of the country
immediately following World War H1.135 With the passage of time,
however, the thought of national commercial activity grinding to a halt due
to labor unrest has become as alien to most judges as it is to most
Americans. This is especially true as union density continues to decline.1 36
Further, concepts like "industrial self-government"1 37 have grown as alien
to most people as have concepts of unions in general. The result of this has
been a change over time in the courts' approach to labor arbitration; some
133 Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578 ("In the commercial case,
arbitration is the substitute for litigation. Here, arbitration is the substitute for industrial
strife."); Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 265 (1964) ("The underlying
purpose of the national labor laws is to promote collective bargaining agreements and to help
give substance to such agreements through the arbitration process.").
134 Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456 (stating that the courts were to develop a body of
federal common law for labor arbitration).
135 See, e.g., Paul Weiler, Striklng a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the
Prospectsfor Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 369 n.60 (1984) (noting the
severe economic turbulence caused by post-World War U strikes and how that figured into
passage of Taft-Hartley).
136 Unions represented only 10.4% of the private-sector work force in 1995. Union
Membership Drops 300,000 in 1995, BNA Pensions & Benefits Daily, Feb. 14, 1996 (citing
just-released Bureau of Labor Statistics study). For discussion of factors contributing to the
decline in union representation since the peak in the 1940's, see generally GOLDFIELD supra
note 7, at 115-217; GEOGHEGAN, supra note 8; Charles B. Craver, Rearranging Deckchairs
on the itanic: The Inadequacy of Modest Proposals to Reform Labor Law, 93 MIcH. L. REv.
1616 (1995) (book review) (discussing and critiquing differing rationales for the decline in
union representation); Richard L. Trumka, Why Labor Law Has Failed, 89 W. VA. L. REV.
871 (1987).
137 Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 581.
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of the case law which came soon after the Trilogy has been modified in
recent years as its inherent attractiveness has faded with its context. 138
While the Trilogy is dated, 139 the FAA by contrast is recent and is
founded upon contract theory, a concrete foundation. Courts may be more
likely to respond favorably to those concepts to which they can relate. 140
Further, it is not unreasonable to believe that there has been an
intermingling of the arbitration doctrines at various points.141 This
intermingling occurred in part with the Misco decision. In its aftermath,
lower courts, in addition to citing it in labor cases, use it as the federal
common law benchmark for defining the point at which they may disrupt
contracts generally on policy grounds. 142 This result is of course not
unreasonable, given that this was what a fair reading of W.R. Grace and
Misco conveys, and given that many labor scholars have urged that courts
treat collective bargaining agreements as they would other contracts, in an
attempt to regain deference. 143 This is the stance of the Sixth Circuit, which
has been consistent in giving a narrow read to Misco in these other
contexts. 144 Some other courts seem to employ a different, narrower reading
of the case in the non-labor context, with the result that the terms of
collective bargaining agreements are more likely to be stricken than are
138 This seems especially true as regards the "essence" test of Enterprise Wheel, in that
courts are less willing to allow arbitrators to broadly interpret contract language. This is
perhaps a consequence of distrust of labor arbitration, but may also be due to allegiance to
contract theory over Trilogy concepts, and a reluctance to impose additional contract terms on
a party. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text (discussing this possibility). One
result of this lack of shared context is that a patchwork of decisions exists-hardly a seamless
web: "Review of arbitration decisions is one of the more difficult and standardless enterprises
facing an appellate judge." Lattimer-Stevens Co., 913 F.2d at 1170 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
139 Estreicher, supra note 128, at 754 ("[IThe Trilogy's model of labor arbitration is
inseparable from the institution of collective bargaining, which is very much on the decline
today.").
140 Gottesman, supra note 78, at 90 (noting that many judges appointed since the early
1980's have had little exposure to arbitration awards and find the whole process foreign).
141 See, e.g., Malin & Ladenson, supra note 128.
142 See, e.g., American Cas. Co. v. FDIC, 39 F.3d 633, 637-39 (6th Cir. 1994)
(contract case); Board of County Comm'rs v. Kimball, 860 F.2d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 1988)
(non-labor FAA arbitration case).
143 E.g., Summers, supra note 74. This represents a departure from the early
interpretation of such agreements, e.g. Justice Douglas's flowery prose in the Trilogy.
144 See, e.g., American Cas. Co. 39 F.3d at 637-39 (contract case); Kimball, 860 F.2d
at 686 (6th Cir. 1988) (FAA arbitration case). Because of this consistency, the Court should
be receptive to citation of these non-labor cases in the Trilogy context.
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terms of other contracts. 145 This double-usage of Misco may provide an
answer to the Supreme Court's reluctance in setting forth a standard in
Misco: namely that liberal justices were afraid that adoption of the union's
position in that case would result in limiting judicial power to address the
public's interest in curtailing private law-making in non-labor contexts. 146 If
this was their concern, it has been realized.
The Sixth Circuit read Misco as being an important case, one more case
in a long line which has sought to remind the lower courts that, when
presented with a challenge to an arbitration award, their duty is not to do
abstract justice, but rather, with limited exceptions, to enforce the award
regardless of how repugnant the award may seem with respect to any
objective or subjective standard. 147 It is the contention of this Note,
however, that the position of the Sixth Circuit as regards public policy is
one founded as much in contract as it is in the Trilogy. This puts the court,
as regards philosophic justification, between the two camps favoring narrow
review of awards: 148 the conservative school, whose representative is Judge
Frank Easterbrook, and whose justification is almost purely contractual; 149
145 E. g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Conner, 973 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1992) (reading
Misco and policy narrowly in commercial setting). There is no reason, practically speaking,
for less respect to be given to the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. There is
certainly much more equality of bargaining power in labor agreements than in many of the
situations the Supreme Court has recently faced where it has ordered enforcement of the
contract. If anything, employers, which typically are the challengers of labor awards, enjoy
far greater bargaining power than do unions, whose power to strike and pressure employers
has been dramatically reduced over the past decades. Why should courts operating under a
conservative, pro-contract mindset find that the only time the public interest needs to be taken
into account is when the noxious provision is found in a collective bargaining agreement? See
also Karl E. Kare, Traditional Labor Law Scholarship and the Crisis in Collective Bargaining
Law: A Reply to Professor Finldn, 44 MD. L. REV. 731, 767 (1985) (criticizing and rejecting
theory of "contractualist labor law" as fundamentally misapprehending the inequality of
bargaining power in collective bargaining relationships).
146 Cf. Misco, 484 U.S. at 46 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Nor do ,I understand the
Court to decide, more generally, in what way, if any, a court's authority to set aside an
arbitration award on public policy grounds differs from its authority, outside the collective-
bargaining context, to refuse to enforce a contract on public policy grounds. Those issues are
left for another day.").
147 See Eberhard Foods v. Handy, 868 F.2d 890, 891 (6th Cir. 1989) ("The Court
again advised lower federal courts to be more deferential to the arbitration process.").
148 Professor Vetter noted this seemingly unusual lineup in the late eighties. Jan Vetter,
Enforceabilty of Awards Post-Misco, in ARBITRATION 1988: EMEROING ISSUES FOR THE
1990's 78-84 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 1989).
149 See Easterbrook, supra note 105.
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and the liberal school, whose representative is Judge Harry Edwards, and
whose justification is found in the national labor laws.150
This section has attempted to explain what some might see as a position
out of character for the Sixth Circuit-deference to labor arbitration awards.
Regardless of how well deserved the court's reputation might be in
deferring under Enterprise Wheel, it is clear that the court has staked out a
deferential position in the public-policy debate. Knowing what might
influence the court's decision-making, it is hoped, will help predict where it
might go in the future.
V. CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit's interpretation of the public-policy exception may
well represent a departure from its reputation as an Enterprise Wheel-
skeptic, but as argued above it may demonstrate that the court is not anti-
arbitration. Rather the court is more comfortable with one arbitration theory
over another. Regardless, the court's cases make clear that the public-policy
argument is not one to which the court will be overly receptive, and a
review of recent challenged arbitration awards reveals that obstinate parties
do not utilize this theory as often as is the practice in broad-review circuits
such as the Third and Fifth. 151
Regardless of one's position as to the propriety of the employee
conduct and substantive contract terms challenged under these awards, it
must be agreed that the status of collective bargaining agreements cannot be
relegated behind that of other contracts. At the least, it must be first among
equals. As it relates to public policy, the Sixth Circuit has acknowledged
that.
Arlus J. Stephens
150 See Edwards, supra note 71.
151 The advantage of a well defined, bright-line test for public policy is that those who
bring improper suits designed to harass have less ability to hide behind a good faith-
compliance shield when sanctions are requested. See Monroe Auto Equip., 981 F.2d at 269-70
(noting that attorney's fees may be appropriate in an action to enforce if the obstinate party's
position is without basis).
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